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COMMISSIONING THE PAST IN NORTHERN IRELAND
Patricia Lundy
Abstract 
At the end of conflict societies are often faced with difficult choices about whether and how best to deal with the past. In Northern Ireland a Legacy Commission has been proposed. This article explores in what ways, if any, a truth commission might add value to the existing past-focused mechanisms in Northern Ireland, with a particular emphasis on the Historical Enquiries Team (HET). It further considers the dilemmas and tensions the proposed Legacy Commission has generated and what this tells us about the contested nature of transitional justice claims both in the international context and in one transitional society, Northern Ireland. 







Northern Ireland presents an interesting case study into how a settled European liberal democracy has approached questions of transitional justice “post-conflict”. In January 2009, the British government appointed a Consultative Group on the Past to consult widely and recommend how best Northern Ireland could deal with its past.​[1]​ The Consultative Group surprised many and generated considerable debate, by proposing a five-year Legacy Commission (or truth commission). If adopted the proposals would supersede the “package of measures” already put in place by the British authorities to deal with legacy issues. According to some, the Legacy Commission would “supplement or supplant an investigative and criminal justice apparatus that is fully operational and, in the official view, up to the task.”​[2]​ In this context, the article explores why a Legacy Commission was proposed and what benefits, if any, it might offer Northern Ireland’s “post-conflict” transition. In order to examine these issues the article is divided into six parts. Part one, examines the wider theoretical debates and contested nature of truth commission claims. Part two provides an overview of developments in dealing with the past in Northern Ireland since the signing of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement.​[3]​ Part three unpacks the main features of the proposed Legacy Commission and aspects of existing measures. It is beyond the scope of this article to carry out a detailed analysis of the “package of measure”. Instead it draws upon over four years’ empirical research on a central component of the measures, the Historical Enquiries Team (HET).​[4]​ Part four examines a range of contentious issues and considers a way forward on a number of key concerns. Part five discusses responses to the proposals; followed in Part six by an examination of the value and likely contribution of a Legacy Commission. This exploration provides the opportunity to explore the benefits, challenges and dilemmas that are indicative of commissioning the past internationally. 


Part 1. The Contested Claims of Truth Commissions

The literature on truth commissions has developed extensively over the past few decades.​[5]​ Such initiatives are now endorsed internationally as an effective and necessary component of successful peace building. The United Nations in particular has embraced and employed transitional justice discourse and truth commissions in its interventions in “post-conflict” situations.​[6]​ The benefits attributed to truth commissions include their ability to help victims, establish an authoritative record of the past, promote accountability, draw a clear line between past and present, deter future abuses and encourage reconciliation. These claims are however the subject of intense debate.​[7]​ As David Mendeloff puts it, they are based more on faith than fact.​[8]​ While an in-depth examination of the concept of “truth” is outside the limits of this article; its multiplicity, subjectivity and partiality make the goal of establishing a common narrative, or claim to “the truth”, highly contested. As Erin Daly notes, the problem is that the truth neither is nor does all that we expect of it.​[9]​ Advocates argue the rationale for seeking to establish an authoritative record is to reveal the extent and nature of violations and establish responsibility. This will in turn inform the population about the events of the past and challenge denial. An example of this is the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission, which challenged denial and established beyond doubt the full extent of the horrific nature of apartheid. Critics point out that in other instances the findings of truth commissions have been ignored or even disputed. In a recent poll in Serbia, half of the respondents said they did not believe Serbs had committed war crimes during the 1990s despite the findings of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY).​[10]​ Proponents further claim that by learning from the mistakes of the past it will prevent a repetition of human rights abuses in the future — the “never again” maxim. The assumption is “truth” recovery helps develop democracy by establishing respect for human rights and the rule of law. Again, this assertion is open to question. If future abuses do not occur it would be difficult to establish a clear causal relationship between the two. A fundamental question is whether truth commissions facilitate reconciliation. What reconciliation is and what it entails is unclear. Such a process is likely to require long-term policy initiatives and depend on a range of social factors unrelated to a truth commission. Indeed, establishing the “truth” is no guarantee that beliefs and attitudes change. Groups within society may support “truth” recovery because it serves to cast blame on other groups; Croatians tend to support the ICTY because they believe it demonstrates that the Serbs committed more crimes against Croatians. In these circumstances, and as we will see in Northern Ireland, “truth” recovery can play directly into the hands of ethnic divisions and hatred.​[11]​ 

Advocates make further claims that by acknowledging suffering and wrongdoing and allowing victims to tell their story it will help restore dignity and assist the healing process. Elizabeth Stanley makes the point that the healing function is dependent upon recognition and truth commissions can actually inhibit recognition of victims, particularly those of state violence. Typically most perpetrators tend not to present themselves, or disconnect from transitional processes, as in South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission.​[12]​ This is compounded by the fact that victims are often disappointed and frustrated because their case is not investigated, despite having given testimony. The most marginalised victims are often excluded; “stories” of the injured, tortured, or those who have suffered forced removals and economic hardships are frequently not incorporated or “given voice” in truth commissions. And, while in some cases hearing the “truth” may be beneficial and can ultimately help individuals heal; in others the “truth” can re-traumatise victims and make their suffering worse.​[13]​ 

Perhaps the most damming criticism is the ability of truth commissions to achieve accountability and combat impunity. Amnesties and incentives were justified as a means to reconciliation in Latin America in the 1980s and ‘90s. The dilemma for these fledging democracies was a trade off between “justice” versus “peace”. Unqualified or blanket amnesty for those accused of serious violations have been held to be in violation of international human rights law.​[14]​ The need to resort to such compromises has been questioned. It has been argued that when properly pursued justice and peace can promote and sustain one another; and there is no intrinsic incompatibility. ​[15]​ In countries where huge international support has been given to promote transitional justice, progress towards accountability is frustratingly low. In Guatemala, the criminal justice system has failed to investigate and address serious past human rights abuses, known abusers remain in positions of authority and human rights violations continue, in spite of having had two truth commissions.​[16]​ This realisation has given rise to an argument that de facto impunity prevails in circumstances where the recommendations of truth commissions can be largely ignored without sanction. It raises further serious questions about the usefulness of truth commissions to prime transitional states for change and foster reform as claimed. ​[17]​

This was not intended to be a comprehensive evaluation of truth commissions but rather to illustrate the conflicting and contested nature of truth commission claims. It is evident that after more than two decades of infatuation with truth commissions there is very little empirical research to substantiate competing claims of either benefits or harmful effects. This is not to say that “truth” recovery should not be pursued. On the contrary, what has been argued is policy-makers and practitioners should exercise more caution in promoting the capabilities of commissions and ambitious expectations should be curbed.​[18]​ The possibility of a truth commission for Northern Ireland will be explored through the prism of past international experience. 


Part 2: The Local Context: Developments in Dealing with the Past
Between 1966 and 1999 approximately 3,636 people died as a result of the conflict in Northern Ireland and many more suffered injury and loss.​[19]​ During this period there were widespread and systematic violations of human rights by state and non-state actors and allegations of collusion between state agencies and Loyalist paramilitaries. Unlike many other “post-conflict” societies, “truth” recovery was not envisaged as part of the initial Northern Ireland peace deal. The Good Friday Agreement (hereafter the Agreement) was reached by all but one of the major political parties in Northern Ireland, and the British and Irish governments in 1998.​[20]​ It was a complex, multi-faceted document dealing with a wide range of issues that had both caused and arisen as a result of over thirty years of conflict. The creation of a comprehensive past-focused mechanism was not part of the discussions. The Agreement itself was more forward facing in respect of providing practical support for victims than dealing with the past. In order to achieve agreement, the “constructive ambiguity” that defined the peace process placed a premium on avoiding broaching anything as contentious and potentially divisive as a truth commission. Instead issues that in other circumstances might have fallen under the remit of a truth commission (reform of the police force, a review of the criminal justice system, prisoner releases, and so forth) were disaggregated and dealt with incrementally.​[21]​ Considerable tension and debate did emerge and continues today over the early release of conflict-related prisoners, the fate of the “disappeared”, and calls for further investigations into state killings and allegations of collusion between the security forces and Loyalist paramilitaries. Twelve years have passed since the Agreement was signed, and there have been dramatic changes that have transformed society. However it is notable that the legacy of the past remains an outstanding issue of the peace process. 

Transitional justice strategies have traditionally been associated with transition from authoritarian and undemocratic states to democracy. The supposition is systematic human rights violations would not happen in a liberal democracy, committed to the rule of law. Northern Ireland demonstrates that this is not confined to underdeveloped dictatorial regimes and can occur in western highly developed democracies with a plethora of human rights protections, legislation and institutions designed to detect and protect victims of such violations within an ostensible democracy.​[22]​ Indeed this context may constrain acknowledgement of abuse as government is less willing to accept institutional failure.​[23]​ The British state has resisted acknowledging its role in the conflict and sections of society in Northern Ireland have difficulty in recognizing that the State may have been involved in more than a neutral role. The Consultative Group on the Past found: “This is one of the crucial issues facing us as a Group, difficult as it may be for some in our society to hear; that elements of the State, on occasions, acted outside the law.”​[24]​ 

The British government has taken steps to address some of the most contentious historic killings and breaches in the rule of law, often as a result of vigorous campaigns by relatives of victims. There have been a number of important inquiries into disputed killings and into both general and specific allegations of collusion between the police and other state agencies and loyalist paramilitary groups against the Catholic population during the conflict.​[25]​ These separate inquiries found grounds for further investigations and inquiries into collusion. The UK government also has certain commitments and obligations arising from international law including those emanating from the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and its implementation domestically through the Human Rights Act 1998. The UK government has been found in breach of Article 2, the right to life, in a number of cases in Northern Ireland. In a joint judgment delivered on 4 May 2001 the court set out the elements which must be adhered to for an investigation to be Article 2 compliant — effectiveness, independence, promptness, accessibility to the family and sufficient public scrutiny.​[26]​  In 2002, in response to the above judgments, the UK Government presented the ECHR with a “package of measures”,​[27]​ which it claimed were necessary steps to address the issues raised in the Court’s judgment and would ensure future Article 2 compliant investigations.​[28]​ A key component of the “package of measures” presented to the Committee of Ministers was the Historical Enquires Team (HET). 

The HET is a special unit of the Police Service of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Its remit is to re-examine all deaths attributed to the Northern Ireland conflict between 1968 and 1998;​[29]​ 2,002 of which were never solved.​[30]​ The HET is unique in policing internationally and is breaking new ground as an innovative transitional justice mechanism.​[31]​ The primary objective is to provide a family-centred approach, to identify and address unresolved questions from the families’ perspective, working to the principle of maximum permissible disclosure. It is funded by the Northern Ireland Office (NIO) to the tune of £32 million over a six-year timeframe and was launched January 2006. In order to meet Article 2 requirements, and build confidence and trust, an independent team was established to work alongside retired RUC officers from Northern Ireland. The “independent” team is staffed entirely by retired police officers from forces outside Northern Ireland (England, Scotland and Wales) and deals exclusively with cases that require independence. Policing has been high on the political agenda in the context of the Northern Ireland peace process. The nature of the Northern Ireland State has been contested and the perceived role of the police in buttressing it created a legitimacy crisis for the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC), renamed PSNI.​[32]​ Lack of acceptance of the police has been greatest among the Catholic/ Nationalist community. The force has traditionally been Protestant/ Unionist dominated. As noted above, the RUC has been the focus of allegations of human rights abuses and collusion with loyalist paramilitary groups during the conflict. This created a legacy for its successor, the PSNI, and has remained a significant impediment to building public confidence in policing. The HET is regarded as the litmus test that policing had been transformed and is capable of dealing with the past. 

After a period of monitoring how the UK has responded to its Article 2 obligations the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, has allowed some matters to close, and others to remain open; the Secretariat reported that the HET can be considered as a useful model for bringing “a measure of resolution” to those affected in long-standing conflicts, and reiterated that it awaited evidence of “concrete results”.​[33]​ As posited elsewhere, the ECHR cases have been a key “driver” in the HET process.​[34]​ The “package of measures” has not received universal acceptance: human rights organisations, victims groups and others have raised concerns about independence, capacity, quality or “patchiness of outcomes”, differentiation in treatment, unreasonable delays and Article 2 compatibility in general.​[35]​
 
A final point under this section is that in the absence of a coherent official strategy to address outstanding issues of the past a range of unofficial initiatives have been undertaken by a number of well- organised human rights and victims’ non-governmental organisations (NGO) and other community-based processes. Traditionally, but not exclusively, such initiatives emerged and garnered support within the nationalist community. They have included “truth” recovery, story telling, memorial projects and a range of justice campaigns. Taken together, such “bottom-up” processes constitute a substantive civil society response to the imperatives of post-conflict “truth” recovery. Against this background, in June 2007 the British government set up the Consultative Group on the Past to consider the landscape of initiatives that have already been undertaken by Governments and NGOs to deal with the past, consult widely, and to come up with the best way forward. It is to this issue that the article now turns.


Part 3: Commissioning the Past: Options in Northern Ireland

The Consultative Group on the Past was co-chaired by Lord Robin Eames (former Archbishop of Armagh and Primate of All Ireland), Denis Bradley (former Vice-Chairman of the Policing Board); and six other individuals broadly representative of the various political and religious communities in Northern Ireland. Two internationals advised the Group, Martii Ahtisaari, former President of Finland, and Brian Currin, a South African attorney involved in the creation of the South African Truth and Reconciliation Commission. The Group was initially greeted with a certain amount of scepticism within sections of the community. The British government appointed its members and for some this cast doubt on its independence and legitimacy. During eighteen-month consultation the Group consulted widely and demonstrated a willingness to listen sensitively to a range of voices and concerns. ​[36]​ This earned it credibility and respect from some of its former critics. The Group’s Report was launched in January 2009 and contained thirty-one recommendations. Given the contested nature of the past in Northern Ireland it is perhaps unsurprising that the Report generated considerable controversy and at times hostility.​[37]​ As discussed later, particular anger was directed at the proposal for a one-off “recognition payment” of £12,000 to be made to the nearest relative in all conflict related deaths.​[38]​ In June 2009 the Secretary of State launched a Northern Ireland Office (NIO) consultation process on the Group’s recommendations which was completed in October 2009.​[39]​ At the time of writing, the outcome of the NIO consultation is unknown.

The Proposals for a Legacy Commission

The Consultative Group’s core proposal is the establishment of an independent Legacy Commission that would create processes of reconciliation, justice and information recovery. It would have the overarching objective of promoting peace and stability in Northern Ireland with a budget of £300 million and within a timeframe of 5 years. An International Commissioner is proposed as Chair and two other Commissioners with separate responsibilities. The mandate would consist of the following four strands of work; to help society towards a shared and reconciled future, through a process of engagement with community issues arising from the conflict; review and investigate historical cases; conduct a process of information recovery; and examine linked or thematic cases emerging from the conflict.​[40]​ It is not possible to consider all thirty-one recommendations in this article; the focus will be primarily on Strands 2, 3 and 4 and proposals related to justice and information recovery. Figure 1 below illustrates the proposed Legacy Commission structure and the four strands of its mandate. 

Figure 1: Independent Legacy Commission Structure


The Group’s Report indicated that many families that spoke to its members expressed a desire for prosecutions. Even though the Group had come to the view that there was a need for greater realism about the prospects of securing prosecutions, it was judged important to keep this avenue open to families. Thus, a new independent Review and Investigation Unit was proposed to replace the HET as Strand 2 of the Legacy Commission’s work. This Unit would review and investigate all historical cases with a view to prosecution, backed by police powers. Essentially this is a normal police investigation working to normal policing standards. Thus, the process was designed to comply in the first instance with the demands for criminal justice to the highest evidential standards. Once the investigative process was exhausted, a separate and sequential process with different powers and procedures would aim to maximise the chances of obtaining information for families. The Review and Investigation Unit [Strand 2] would therefore be kept separate from the Information Recovery Unit [Strand 3] and Thematic Unit [Strand 4]. A number of safeguards were built in with regard to the tensions between truth and justice that aimed to ensure cases with significant evidence came to court. That is, only when individual cases had been reviewed/ investigated, and when there were no evidential opportunities and prosecution to be pursued, would a case progress to the information recovery or thematic processes. If evidential opportunities emerged, the case would be forwarded to the Public Prosecution Service for consideration. If evidence emerged outside the process about a particular crime, the suspect would still face criminal prosecution before the court. Figure 2 below illustrates the sequential stages.







At this point it is important to reflect on the viability of prosecutions in Northern Ireland. A number of influential commentators have publicly acknowledged that prosecutions are likely only in a small number of historic cases, because they would not meet current evidentiary standards.​[41]​ In many historic cases witnesses have died, files have been misplaced or destroyed, and exhibits and forensic evidence contaminated are no longer credible. The former Chief Constable, Sir Hugh Orde, has repeatedly stated that in an evidential sense the PSNI will struggle to secure convictions.​[42]​ After meeting a wide range of experts and officials, the Consultative Group concluded that it was their duty to tell the public that this was the reality of the situation and not to perpetuate false hopes of convictions. Some families and a number of NGOs working mainly (but not exclusively) within the nationalist community have reached a similar conclusion. “Truth” and acknowledgement are what these families seek.​[43]​ This article contends, and will discuss in detail later, that if the prospects of securing prosecutions and convictions are limited, then alternative forms of justice are valid in order to meet victims’ needs. 

The Consultative Group’s Report stated, while complete truth might be unattainable, they believed it might still be possible to recover information of importance to families and society. It recommended that the process of recovering information of importance to relatives (information recovery) would be subject to a distinct process within the Legacy Commission under a separate Commissioner. This would constitute Stand 3 of the Commission’s work (as illustrated in Figure 1 above). The Information Recovery Unit would only review a case if the consent of the next-of-kin were obtained. The Unit would not have the power to compel witnesses but could compel documents. While an amnesty was ruled out, a protected statement was proposed to encourage cooperation (discussed in detail below). The Report noted that, “there is a potential tension between the remit of the HET to pursue a normal police investigation while combining this with a process of information recovery.”​[44]​ As argued elsewhere, the HET methods hinge on fresh evidential opportunities, which according to the informed view, appear to be largely unachievable.​[45]​ It is important to understand that the HET is located within the criminal justice system, and the re-examination of cases is therefore conducted to criminal standards of proof. The process is driven by the identification of new evidential opportunities and this underpins the progression of cases. This, it has been argued, has a delimiting effect in the pursuit of information recovery.​[46]​ The re-examination of historical cases and answering families’ questions does not demand the same approach or methods as a “live” police murder investigation. “Truth” recovery is about taking a much broader view than a typical police-style investigation. This legalistic approach sits alongside a more “cathartic” process of “truth recovery”; which includes answering a wide range of often-untypical investigation questions that are of interest to families. Traditional policing methods, namely assessing old cases for investigative opportunities, sit uneasily within this process.​[47]​ The proposed separation of Units proposed by the Consultative Group could overcome this problem and allow a less restricted or unencumbered approach to answering families’ questions. Indeed, in order to achieve the aim of information recovery a separation of tasks and units, operating under distinct rules and guidelines, is necessary and desirable. The process would be further strengthened and wider public confidence restored if government demonstrated political will for rigorous investigation by providing the Legacy Commission with access to official documents that have been previously withheld.​[48]​ The proposed new independent Information Recovery and Review and Investigative Units would be one way of addressing Article 2 compliant concerns that some NGOs and families have in relation to the HET. There are lessons that have been learned and these need to be taken into account in the development of Strands 2 and 3 of the Legacy Commission. 

The Consultative Group also recommended that a new Thematic Examination Unit should be set up as the fourth strand of its work. The Group considered that alongside information recovery on a case-by-case basis, there was a need to examine linked cases and themes arising from the conflict that remain of public concern. Some cases have raised particular concern or touch on a theme, including “specific areas of paramilitary activity, or alleged collusion.”​[49]​ The thematic examination would take place without public hearing or formal parties to proceedings and no cross-examination other than by the Commissioners. The Group argued this would facilitate more open and frank disclosure and avoid the constant publicity of present inquiry proceedings. As there would be no formal parties, there would be no general circulation of all documents. The logic here appears to have been to avoid overly adversarial and costly legal proceedings associated with some public inquiries in Northern Ireland. The Unit would, however, have the power to compel witnesses unlike the Information Recovery Unit; it would also have the power to compel documents. The Group’s Report states that “participants in these processes would need to have access to independent legal advice and would have the right to legal representation”, but does elaborate further.​[50]​ The following section explores a number of contentious issues that the proposals have generated including amnesty, the Commissions powers and processes and independence. A way forward on some of these key concerns is proposed.


Part 4: Contentious Issues and Seeking a Way Forward

Amnesty: Pragmatic or Principled Approach?

The Consultative Group as noted has ruled out a general amnesty but proposed a protected statement. According to this process confidential statements could be made to the Information Recovery Unit and the Thematic Examination Unit when prosecutions are deemed unlikely due to lack of evidence. Such statements would not be admissible in criminal or civil proceedings. It is the statement that is protected and not the person. The aim is to “encourage free and frank disclosure of information” relevant to a particular case.​[51]​ It is now crystal clear that unqualified or blanket amnesty for those accused of serious violations are regarded as in violation of international human rights law. The international “community” has also moved away from granting conditional amnesties for serious human rights violations similar to the one adopted in the South African TRC.​[52]​ Yet empirical data on amnesty provision between 2001 and 2005 shows that amnesties have continued to be a political reality despite international efforts to combat impunity.​[53]​ Thus international debate continues on, whether measures short of an amnesty could be considered as an acceptable compromise in certain circumstances. Priscilla Hayner notes that, “there remain many areas not prescribed by law, and which allow a range of policy options for national actors.”​[54]​ While in principle there are legally binding international standards, it would appear there is room for flexibility that does not preclude a form of amnesty in certain circumstances (other than for gross human rights abuses), if accompanied by alternative mechanisms to fulfil victims’ rights and in the interest of peace and stability. The important questions that then arise are: under what circumstances, and for what crimes, are amnesties permissible? What are the alternative forms of justice that would not be perceived as “second best” to prosecutions? These are the major dilemmas of transitional justice.

In Northern Ireland amnesty is not without precedent; in May 1969 a general amnesty was granted aimed at de-escalating the conflict around civil rights unrest,​[55]​and immunity was permitted in the work of the Independent Commission for the Location of Victims’ Remains,​[56]​ the Bloody Sunday Inquiry and the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. The Early Release Scheme introduced in NI Sentences Act 1998, which could be regarded as an amnesty, provided for the release of prisoners who belonged to paramilitary groups that had signed up to ceasefires. In addition, there is a perception within sections of the community that a de facto amnesty has existed for certain perpetrators of human rights abuses during the conflict in Northern Ireland. State security forces killed 350 people, but only twenty-four prosecutions and eight convictions have resulted;​[57]​ these figures exclude cases where collusion between state forces and loyalist paramilitaries may have occurred. The paucity of criminal sanctions resulting from these incidents has created the perception that state agents operated with virtual impunity.​[58]​ The human rights community in Northern Ireland appears divided over whether a form of amnesty could be human rights compliant and what can or should be done in this regard. To some the Consultative Group’s proposed protected statement (as discussed above) is totally unacceptable and “tantamount to amnesty”. Public opinion, as recently gauged in the Northern Ireland Life and Times (NILT) survey, appears to indicate that there is little appetite for amnesty. In a representative sample of 1,800 across Northern Ireland, only 19.4% agreed or strongly agreed with the suggestion that “people should be free from possible prosecution for past actions including killings” if they gave evidence to a truth commission. 60.5% disagreed, including a third (31.1%) who strongly disagreed. Protestant respondents were notably more antagonistic towards the idea of amnesty than Catholics.​[59]​ 

The UN Rule-of-Law Tools for Truth Commissions states that “the granting of amnesty should not be confused with granting use immunity which is acceptable under international law”.​[60]​ There are different sources of information that Commissions rely upon to inform their work. Official documentation is one source and as discussed below this is highly problematic. The HET does not have the power to compel witnesses and arrests cannot be made unless new evidential opportunities emerge. Even if an individual is compelled, there is no guarantee that he or she will participate. In such circumstances information retrieval is dependent upon voluntary co-operation. Why would someone volunteer to come forward and run the risk of self-incrimination? An incentive or guarantee is therefore likely to be required in order to encourage ex-combatants to cooperate with the proposed Commission. As discussed later, it is imperative that the granting of immunity as a “carrot” for the recovery of “truth” is assessed alongside the reality of securing prosecutions in Northern Ireland and the perceived de facto amnesty. Concern has also been expressed that information in protected statements would not be verified and/or corroborated, and this would result in misinformation being fed into the processes. It is common practice internationally for truth commissions to corroborate and verify information submitted (albeit to varying efficiency). What the Consultative Group’s Report proposes is no different; it states “the Commission would have both the power and indeed the duty to test information given to it”.​[61]​ 

 Powers and Processes: Opening Avenues or Closing Doors?

In addition to protected statements the Consultative Group proposed a unique strategy of formal and informal processes to obtain information from a range of state and non-state actors in the conflict. “Procedures in the Information Recovery and Thematic Examination Unit would be flexible and might include contacts with suspected offenders, or paramilitaries, or government agencies.”​[62]​ The purpose is to establish institutional responsibly, as opposed to “naming or blaming individuals”, and in doing so “obtain a greater understanding of the conflict, of what went wrong and why”.​[63]​ This has prompted a critical response that what the Group is proposing, “when it speaks of not naming or blaming, is an amnesty by any other name and impunity on a massive scale.”​[64]​ The alternative view is that, rather than individualising guilt, institutional responsibility might encourage former combatants on all sides to cooperate with the Commission. The Consultative Group’s proposed use of alternative processes (informal means) could create the conditions to encourage voluntary cooperation and facilitate access to information that would otherwise be inaccessible. Given the clandestine nature of much of the activities of paramilitary groups and various agents involved in counterinsurgency violence, it makes it difficult to trace certain activities via a paper trail. This is compounded by the reality that HET has inherited empty files, particularly for cases in the early years of the conflict; over the passage of time documents have been destroyed and misplaced; and there have been ineffective investigations in some cases. The integrity of exhibits has also been called into question and the lost forensic opportunity of decommissioned weapons has compounded difficulties.​[65]​ In such circumstances, oral evidence from witnesses or those who were directly involved in incidents is a primary source of knowledge and record of past events. Understandably, there are doubts in some quarters that paramilitary groups will come forward with information and equal scepticism that the security forces will cooperate. This cynicism is reflected in the NILT survey finding that 84% of people felt that a truth commission would “not necessarily get to the truth”.​[66]​ For some, only the full rigour of the law with the power to subpoena and robust cross-examination will get to the “truth”. The power to subpoena has undoubtedly symbolic value and inferences can even be drawn from “silences”. It is however, as already noted, not possible to make someone talk if they choose to forget, or genuinely do not remember, or develop selective amnesia. Since the principle underpinning Strand 3 is voluntary cooperation, the Unit does not require the power to compel (although the Strand 4 Thematic Investigations Unit does have this power). 

If a de facto amnesty already exists for ex-security force personnel and ex-paramilitaries released from prison under the Early Release Scheme, the question then arises: what would be the incentive for such individuals to disclose information to a Legacy Commission? Evidence from other transitional societies tends to indicate that perpetrators are generally reluctant to come forward publicly to official processes. Whether or not ex-combatants are likely to co-operate in informal processes in Northern Ireland remains to be seen; but it is entirely possible that some might come forward for moral reasons, or to “get things off their chest”. Moreover, there are examples of informal processes securing a “measure of resolution” for families in Northern Ireland. These include the Ardoyne Commemoration Project (ACP)​[67]​ and the Independent Commission for the Location of Victims (ICLV).​[68]​ Informal processes are already taking place on the ground within republican/nationalist and loyalist/unionist communities, but these initiatives are unstructured and un-co-ordinated. In a number of cases ex-combatants, including a small number of ex-security forces, have co-operated with informal processes.​[69]​ In comparison to other post-conflict transitions, in Northern Ireland ex-combatants are to the forefront in leading discussions on the issue of “truth” within their own communities. There are international examples of informal processes achieving a “measure of success”; in El Salvador a number of senior-level members of the security forces were willing to meet quietly and confidentially with the commission to provide critical inside information – sometimes agreeing only to meet with the commission outside the country.​[70]​ It is fully acknowledged that evidence received in secret through informal processes runs a far greater risk of being viewed as less trustworthy than those disclosed through official judicial means. It is also true historical memory has weaknesses. It can be unreliable, subjective and partial and there are likely to be competing “truth” claims. Despite these caveats, it is a valuable source that has played a significant role in most truth commissions internationally. Acceptance of such testimony would undoubtedly require achieving trust and a significant leap of faith for some victims on all sides of the conflict to accept the authenticity or truthfulness of claims being made. This goes to the heart of “truth” recovery claims; that creating the space for testimony and the recovery of “truth” can in itself help build trust (obviously this will hinge on validity). This article argues that the incentive of a protected statement and informal processes could open up a “space” (or create the conditions), which would enable new possibilities in seeking answers to questions of importance to families’ and society. The integrity of this process, and in particular the conduits, is imperative. Assurances of confidentiality are crucial and must be adhered to. 

A number of other proposed procedures have generated considerable criticism, particularly from lawyers, sections of the human rights community and others with regards to Strand 4 and thematic investigations. Thematic investigations are about institutional responsibility and as such offer a form of accountability. Much of the Legacy Commission’s deliberations would take place behind closed doors (incidentally, this also pertains to HET procedures). The closed nature of the thematic investigations raises issues of lack of transparency and the public interest aspect of information recovery; it should not be just for the benefit of families but also to meet societal needs. For these reasons it is argued that, there should be public hearings for thematic examinations. This sentiment appears to correspond with public opinion. The NILT survey found that there was overwhelming consensus in favour of the idea that if a truth commission was set up it should be held in public (82%) and have the power to compel people to appear (77%).​[71]​ Indeed, in spite of earlier comments about the drawbacks of selective memory, it could be argued that the power to compel witnesses should be available to the Thematic Unit. In this instance the symbolic value is important. The lack of transparency arising out of the closed nature of the process is reinforced by the proposal not to allow cross-examination by anyone other than the Commission. This has alarmed members of the legal profession in particular. As one lawyer put it, “if you’re not able to use the tools of the trade, the lawyer’s trade, to seek the truth and to challenge versions of events, then why pretend that the Legacy Commission is a proper information recovery process, because it isn’t.”​[72]​ All parties must have the same legal representation to ensure there is a level playing field. That is, the principle of equality of arms must apply. Research has shown that the HET process and the quality and depth of reports (RSR) improved when NGOs or other representatives with experience in casework assisted families.​[73]​ It would be beneficial to include a role for victims and their representatives to ask questions in any “truth” recovery process in Northern Ireland. 





The independence of the Legacy Commission is vital to its success and will determine whether key stakeholders will give support to the process and participate. The Consultative Group proposed that the Commission should be independent and the Chair should be an international of standing.​[75]​ There are clearly defined core principles for establishing a truth commission set out in the UN Rule of Law Tools for Post-Conflict Societies, and operational independence is a fundamental requirement. “The legitimacy and public confidence that are essential for a successful truth commission process depend on the commission’s ability to carry out its work without political interference.”​[76]​ In Northern Ireland there appears to be almost universal distrust of all the organisations, parties and agencies that were perceived as having any involvement in the conflict, to run a truth recovery process. This was reflected in the NILT survey; the only statistic that lifted the all-pervading sense of suspicion was that, 46.6% people felt that an international organisation like the UN should be trusted to run a truth commission. ​[77]​ 

While all three Commissioners should be independent, they do not necessarily need to be internationals. It is crucial to the Commission’s success that Commissioners have the confidence of all sections of society and have sufficient personal authority to “open doors” and accomplish the task. There is a pool of suitably qualified people of status in Northern Ireland that would bring local knowledge, expertise and experience to the role of Commissioner. The process of selecting and appointing Commissioners is crucial. More than any other factor the Commission will be defined by who its members are. The selection process should be independent of political interference, transparent, and involve consultation with civil society. A person (or persons) of international standing could assist in the selection of Commissioners; or in drawing up a list of recommended national and international commissioners that could be used in an open selection process. In Sierra Leone the UN High Commissioner for human rights at the time, Mary Robinson, assisted in such a process.​[78]​ There are examples from other countries of creative ways to do this. A person of international standing could be appointed to act as an Independent Interim Oversight Commissioner to take the Consultative Group’s proposals forward. If an Interim Commissioner were to be appointed he/she could select an independent multidisciplinary team to advise and assist in defining the terms of reference, the selection process of Commissioners and other matters. This might help alleviate concern in some sections of the community that the British government will determine the Commissioners and the terms of reference. The formation of a Commission selected through an independent process will build greater public confidence and create a sense of legitimacy in the process from the outset. 

However, independence goes much deeper than the appointment of commissioners. Staffing and the secretariat of the Legacy Commission are equally fundamental to the integrity of the process; this was not addressed in the Consultative Group’s Report. It is imperative that the Review and Investigation Unit is demonstrably independent. If independence is compromised this has the potential to undermine the other consecutive stages of information recovery and thematic investigation and leave it open to challenge. The lack of independence of the HET has led to criticism of staffing arrangements, the role of gatekeepers, influence of “RUC corporate memory” and “cross-contamination” of organisational linkages.​[79]​ Consequently it has not managed to build cross-community trust and support to the degree anticipated. Sections within the mainly Catholic/Nationalist community, continue to mistrust the process and question its independence to investigate sensitive issues that may touch upon the police themselves. In the absence of a viable alternative some non-aligned NGOs have taken a pragmatic approach and engage with the HET on behalf of “clients”.​[80]​ 

It was proposed that the Commission would directly recruit its own staff for the Review and Investigation Unit, ‘which would need to combine both police and administrative expertise’.​[81]​ This article argues that the Review and Investigation Unit should not be staffed solely by police personnel. A multidisciplinary team is more appropriate and in keeping with international transitional justice practice. It is accepted that police have particular investigative skills and expertise; however this is not the sole preserve of policing, other professionals have invaluable local knowledge and ability to investigate historical cases, represent and support victims. As noted earlier, the re-examination of historical cases and answering families’ questions does not demand the same approach or methods as a “live” police murder investigation. A Review and Investigation Unit could include police from outside Northern Ireland, preferably with experience and knowledge of the conflict. This should be balanced against a more central and active role of non-state actors. Such a structure might include representatives from Human Rights Organisations, NGOs, research organisations and the legal profession. Internationally there are many examples of non-state actors assisting truth commissions extensively in key aspects of their work, including investigations. Issues of security, confidentiality and privacy would need to be carefully considered. However, this should not be insurmountable. Previous truth commissions in other countries have successfully dealt with this challenge and managed to achieve the right balance. There are a number of civilian staffed and multi-disciplinary investigation models including the various Ombudsmen and public inquiries in Northern Ireland and Great Britain that draw upon employees from a variety of backgrounds. Numerous tasks in the HET do not require a policing background. Non-state actors and organisations could carry out such functions equally well and act in an advisory role. Notwithstanding earlier comments about the importance of local input, internationals (not necessarily high profile figures) could help assist with the legacy of the past in Northern Ireland in the following ways. Suitably skilled internationals could be employed as investigators, database specialists, analysts, and policy-advisers, as well as in a range of other positions. This is common practice internationally. It is suggested that internationals would be part of a multi-disciplinary team, a “mixed” model, of locals, UK and international staff that would complement each other. This would provide the opportunity for skills sharing and knowledge transfer and minimise the risk of over dependence on a few key individuals with specialist knowledge and expertise.

The role of the Public Prosecution Service (PPS) in any likely Commission should be addressed. According to some sections of Northern Ireland society, the PPS (formally Director of Public Prosecution) played a non-neutral role in the conflict; its decisions whether to prosecute were not transparent and it was an unaccountable organisation. Indeed, it has been argued that the PPS itself should be the focus of examination under any future truth commission; and that an independent PPS should be set up to run alongside the Commission to ensure the independence and integrity of the process. The Consultative Group stated that to compensate for this, the PPS should include guidance to the Legacy Commission based on established criteria whether a prosecution would be in the public interest. 






The Northern Ireland Affairs Committee (NIAC) concluded that there is insufficient “cross-community consensus” at present for the Consultative Group’s proposal.​[82]​ According to this perspective, it would “do more harm than good” and open up further divisions. In the NIAC’s view, victims’ interests would be better served by providing practical services and storytelling could offer a more suitable and cathartic opportunity to come to terms with the past. This analysis seems to be based on the assumption that storytelling is non-contentious, and not as some have argued, linked to victims’ agency and the struggle for justice.​[83]​ The stipulation for cross-community consensus raises a number of issues. In Northern Ireland there appears to be a polarization of views on “truth” recovery generally along traditional community and political lines. There is a perception that the Protestant/Unionist/Loyalist communities are unwilling to engage with the past and that “truth” recovery is mistrusted as part of a “republican agenda” or “Trojan horse”.​[84]​ However, Loyalist and Unionist families engage with the HET process in order to find answers to unresolved questions about the death of their loved one. The findings of the NILT survey tends to suggest that views are not as polarized as is sometimes thought. When asked whether they thought a truth commission was important or very important for the future of Northern Ireland more people agreed (50%) than disagreed (28%). Catholics were more inclined to favour a truth commission (59%) than Protestants (43%), but even in the latter case this represented more people than those that disagreed (33%).​[85]​ The survey indicates that members of the Unionist community might like to find out the “truth” about the past, but they do not regard it as a priority nor are they convinced that a truth commission is the best way of getting it. Nonetheless, there is deep-seated antagonism towards the idea of “truth” recovery within sections of Unionism. There is particular hostility towards public inquiries on the grounds of cost and their state-centricity. Certainly the strongest criticisms has come from former members of the security forces and their families who believe they have been the brunt of investigations into the past; and feel let down by a government that does not appreciate the sacrifices they have made holding the line during the conflict. Equally contentious is the demands on the PSNI to service historic investigations that diverts scarce resources and compromises ability to effectively police the present.​[86]​

Who are the victims?

The initial public reaction to the Report concentrated on the widely criticised “recognition payment”, overshadowing the other 30 recommendations, and dominated the early days of the debate. Such was the hostility, mainly from sections within the Unionist community, that shortly after the Report was published the Secretary of State Shaun Woodward announced that the “recognition payment” would not be implemented.​[87]​ The Unionist community were angered at the moral equivalence being made between victim and perpetrator and challenged the Group’s non-hierarchical definition of victim.​[88]​ The level of negative public reaction to the proposed “recognition payment” by some victims and politicians reflects the highly contentious nature of who is a victim and in many respects underpins perceptions of the conflict. Indeed, the very concept of victim can prove an obstacle to dialogue. However the “recognition payment” was viewed by others as a bold and courageous decision by the Consultative Group. 

Principled or Pragmatic Approach?

The response from the human rights community in Northern Ireland to the Consultative Group’s proposals has been mixed. Human rights actors and others have applied, to varying degrees, a series of legal and human rights benchmarks against which they have assessed the proposed Legacy Commission. These benchmarks have included ECHR obligations, customary law, international customary law and international treaty law, and a number of UN soft law standards and principles.​[89]​ While some see merit in the Consultative Group’s proposals, they are critical of its “minimalist” approach to human rights and the primacy given to compliance with ECHR law to the exclusion of other legal standards that pertain.​[90]​ According to one human rights lawyer, “there are very significant deficits in the way in which it frames and understands the relevant international legal universe that applies to the questions it has set itself.”​[91]​ Lawyers in particular have been scathing of the legal framework adopted by the Consultative Group.​[92]​ This overly legalised approach to dealing with the past has given rise to a critique of “legalism”,​[93]​ as well as calls for a more “holistic legal model” employing social science methodologies.​[94]​ While it is laudable to strive for the highest human rights standards attainable when examined through a non-legal lens, the benchmarks appear at times to evoke an overly legalistic approach to the human rights requirements that should underpin a truth commission. This article in no way seeks to question the centrality of long fought for human rights, and concurs that there are standards and obligations that cannot be set aside. What is suggested is that a balance needs to be struck. In practice, a truth commission has to have a realistic chance of gaining co-operation and the participation of all parties to the conflict. What is the point in designing a gold standard human rights mechanism that nobody participates in? As Diane Orentlicher notes, decisions must be made in the face of real-world dilemmas of transitional justice.​[95]​ 


Part 6: Is the Proposed Legacy Commission an Improvement on Current Arrangements? 

This article set out to examine whether or not the proposed Legacy Commission might be an improvement on aspects of the current arrangements in Northern Ireland. Restricting my analysis to a comparison with the HET, the latter has strengths and limitations as discussed above and detailed elsewhere.​[96]​ There are a number of very skilled investigators and highly professional members of the HET who have clearly built good relations with families and NGOs. There are examples of good practice including a family centred approach and a template for historical cases appears to have been recently achieved. Undoubtedly some families are satisfied with the process they have received, others are not. There are however numerous structural limitations.​[97]​ The HET has acknowledged that mistakes have been made and this is reflected in the decision to set up a new Transitional Resolution Team to look afresh and bring up to standard some 85 previously completed Review Summary Reports. In addition, 157 Royal Military Police cases (“RMP cases”) have been “recalled” and are currently being re-examined under a revised process. While this clearly indicates willingness to address and “put things right”; these difficulties have not been made public in the majority of cases. Assessment of a significant sample of Review Summary Reports carried out by the author indicates that only in the more recent reports do the HET draw conclusions and offer deeper analysis (this relates to the template). Analysis and drawing conclusions are surely the added value in the process; otherwise it is simply a regurgitation of material that is already available. 

The three Legacy Commission Units will devote time, expertise and resources to the separate but intimately connected tasks of investigation, information recovery and thematic issues. The HET has struggled to manage these “competing” demands since its inception.​[98]​ This article argues that none of the current arrangements are equipped, and have a remit, to deal comprehensively with thematic issues or macro-analysis.​[99]​ Requests from families and their representatives for thematic investigations and a series of complex linked cases created a “bottleneck” in the HET system. In addition, these cases took the lion’s share of resources and resulted in a general backlog of cases. The Operation Ballast cases are a case in point.​[100]​ Thematic investigations are much broader than simply analysing patterns related to deaths. As the UN has stated, ‘the question why certain events were allowed to happen can be as important as explaining what happened.’​[101]​ This requires a different skill set outside the police experience and a more social scientific approach based on statistical analysis that can provide a broader overarching picture and explanation about the causes, trends and nature of the conflict. In deeply divided societies where policing itself has been contested, attempting to police the past is highly problematic. 





The future of the proposed Legacy Commission remains undecided. This article has argued that it represents a genuine and imaginative contribution to finding a mechanism that could address more comprehensively the legacy of the conflict in Northern Ireland. The current piecemeal and fragmented strategy would be replaced by an integrated and holistic approach. Justice is a contentious issue in any analysis of transitional processes. The proposed Legacy Commission was designed to comply in the first instance with the demands for criminal justice to the highest evidential standards. In view of the unlikelihood of achieving prosecutions and convictions in the majority of cases in Northern Ireland, and a de facto amnesty, the proposed Legacy Commission could offer victims an alternative form of justice. Along with its strengths the proposed Legacy Commission has limitations; these are not insurmountable and could be attended to if the political will exist. This article posits the view that the existing measures, and principally the HET, while providing a “measure of resolution” for some families does not offer Northern Ireland a systematic and comprehensive exploration of the legacy of the past. The existing mechanisms are not designed or equipped to understand the extent and patterns of violations, their causes and consequences and analyse why things were allowed to happen. This is precisely what truth commissions’ offer and it is probably what they do best. 
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